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multinationalism and poly-ethnicism; 123 legal rights and moral rights; 124 first- and
second-class rights; 125 inherent and contingent rights; 1¥lghts to collective
interests and the rights of collective agents; 127 political collective rights and
substantial collective rights; 128 an integrity concept of rights and an agency
concept of rights; 129 fully voluntary groups, entry-voluntary groups, entrance
involuntary but exit-voluntary groups and fully involuntary groups;130 negative
liberty and positive liberty; 131 classical rights and social rights; 132 rights as
individualistic, exclusionary "quasi-absolute debate stopping conclusions" and
rights as relational, open-ended sites of dialogue and struggle.133
Thus, it seems to me that the post-rationalist turn and the various debates
around rights have served both to ground and expand the imagination of high
theory, particularly to the extent that such theory has, historically, been identified
with the decontextualism of analytical positivism. 134
D. The Development of Working and Middle-Order Theories

While Twining sees both of these spheres of theory as closely related, for
exposition purposes he tends to separate them. I will also deal first with middle
order and then with working theory.
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W. Kymlicka, "Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law &
Jur. 239.
M. Hartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law
& Jur. 293.
L. Green & D. Reaume, "Second Class Rights? Principles and Compromise in the
Charter" (1990) 13 Dalhousie L. J. 564.
Macklem, supra note 110; P. Macklem & M. Asch, "Aboriginal Rights and Canadian
Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 498.
L. Green, "Two Views of Collective Rights" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law & Jur. 315.
L. Jacobs, "Bridging the Gap Between Individual and Collective Rights With the Idea
oflntegrity" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law & Jur. 375.

Ibid.

J. Narveson, "Collective Rights?" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law & Jur. 329.
Trakman, supra note 22.
M. Jackman, "Constitutional Rhetoric and Social Justice: Reflections on the
Justiciability Debate" in Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note 23 at 17.
Nedelsky, supra note 48; Nedelsky & Scott, supra note 48.
Much the same can be said of the debate in relation to equality rights. See, for example,
"Symposium on Equality" (1994) 7 Can. J. Law & Jur. 1.
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i)

Middle-Order Theory

Twining is not as clear on this task as he is on some of the others but the
suggestion is that middle theory operates in the realm between those academics
who operate in the domain of high theory and those who toil in the field of legal
doctrinal analysis. Here the target market seems primarily to be other legal
academics and the chore is to develop "fertile hypotheses to guide research and
inquiry in various areas...." 135 Twining proposes that middle-order theorizing can
help stimulate further scholarship, not only in "new and neglected fields of
study," but also generate a "rethinking [of] old ones." 136 Whereas the conduit and
high theory approaches to jurisprudence have a centrifugal dynamic, middle
order theory is more centripetal, or inward looking. It is an exercise in filling the
gap between high theory and the pragmatics of Eractical legal discourse 137 and,
as such, attempts to be a functional discourse. 1 8 This form of theory does not
attempt to generate substantive right answers, but rather to create coherent and
intelligible frames of reference within which others - lawyers, judges or other
academics - can make sense of the tasks they encounter. I will suggest three
examples in the Charter context of middle-order theorizing: the debate on the
legitimacy of judicial review; the question of the application of the Charter and
reliance upon the public/private dichotomy; and the issue of appropriate Charter
remedies.
A review of the literature indicates that the dominant jurisprudential concern
of the last fifteen years has been the issue of the legitimacy of judicial review. 139
.An avalanche of interpretive theories have been advanced by Canadian theorists
in order to provide guidance for the judiciary as to the proper approach to adopt
in applying the Charter: consensualism; 140 purposivism; 141 interpretivism; 142
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"Some Jobs for Jurisprudence," supra note 19 at 159.
Ibid. at 159-60.
"Evidence and Legal Theory," supra note 19 at 65. ·
See, for example, Sharpe, supra note 23.
Despite the intense academic enthusiasm the Supreme Court remains quite disinterested.
See Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 497 per Lamer J.
B. Strayer, "Constitutional Interpretation Based on Consent: Whose Consent and
Measured When?" in Bayefsky, supra note 43 at 187.
B. Etherington, "Freedom of Association and Compulsory Union Dues: Towards a
Purposive Conception of a Freedom Not to Associate" (1987) 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 1; P.
Hogg, "The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987) 25
Osgoode Hall L. J. 87.
Strayer, supra note 22 at v; R. Hawkins, "Interpretivism and Sections 7 and 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1990) 22 Ottawa L. Rev. 275.

Vol. IV, No. 1
Review of Constitutional Studies

The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory

45

pragmatism; 143 social criticism; 144 egalitarian liberalism; 145 liberal legalism; 146
postliberal pluralism; 147 democratic communitarian proceduralism; 148 a process
theory;149 a co-ordinate model; 150 substantive rationality review;151 institutional
dialogue; 1 52 democratic colloquy premised upon a weak form of parliamentary
sovereignty; 153 a grammatical approach in pursuit of self-understanding; 15i
philosophical, contextual and justice inspired approach; 155 a teleological
interpretive discourse/practice;156 postmodern communitarian realism grounded
in a communicative ethos; 157 responsive asymmetricalism; 1 58 philosophical
realism; 159 and "a complex partnership through institutional dialogue between
supercourts and superlegislatures."160 These analyses often are structured around
a review of the relationship between the limitations clause (section 1) and
substantive Charter provisions. 161
The debate as to the scope of the application of the Charter may provide a
second example of middle-order theorizing. Of particular importance here is the
question of the public/private dichotomy. While some have argued that the
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P. Halewood, "Performance and Pragmatism in Constitutional Interpretation" (1990)
3 Can. J. Law & Jur. 91.
Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at 250.
Putting the Charter to Work, supra note 22 at 10; Dyzenhaus, supra note 109.
J. Whyte, "Legality and Legitimacy: The Problem of Judicial Review of Legislation"
(1987) 12 Queen's L. J. 1.
Gold, supra note 75.
P. Monahan, supra note 22 at c. 6.
H. Fairley, "Enforcing the Charter: Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and Just
Standard for Judicial Review" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 217.
Slattery, supra note 71.
A. Brudner; "What Are Reasonable Limits to Equality Rights?" (1986) 64 Can. Bar
Rev. 469.
Fitzgerald, supra note 14.
Bayefsky, supra note 43 at 148-62.
B. Langille, "The Jurisprudence of Despair, Again" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 549.
Lyon, supra note 72.
Conklin, supra note 29.
Trakman, supra note 22 at c. 5-6.
Webber, supra note 22 at 244-59.
The Law of the Charter: General Principles, supra note 22 at 47, 83.
Weinrib, supra note 71 at 564-65.
See, for example, Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22; Brudner, supra note
151; Monahan, supra note 22 at 115-17.
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Charter should only apply to state action, 162 others have argued that it should
encompass a much larger range of relationships between members of society. 163
Still others have pointed to the incoherence and arbitrariness of these positions
because of the way they rely on dichotomous thinking engendered by liberal
ideology and they invoke decisions such as Dolphin Delivery 164 as confirmation
of the poverty of such c:tnalyses. 165 Often one's position on this debate is
informed by whether one is more liberal, feminist, democratic or communitarian
in one's underlying legal philosophy.166

The issue of legitimate Charter remedies provides another example of
middle-order theory: assuming there is a breach of a Charter provision, what is
the right response? 167 Canadian jurists have been particularly interested in the
remedy of "reading in." 168 Some have argued that such a strategy is legitimate
not just because it is implied by section 24 but also on the basis of the argument
that to allow the courts only the limited remedy of striking down a provision
could result in "equality with a vengeance," 169 making more people worse off
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M. Pilkington, "Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 62 Can. Bar Rev. 517; K. Swinton, "Application of the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms" in Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin, supra note 23
at 41; J. Whyte,"Is the Private Sector Affected by the Charter?" in Smith et al., supra
note 23 at 145.
Brodsky & Day, supra note 89; R. Elliott & R. Grant, "The Charter's Application in
Private Litigation" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 459; D. Gibson, "The Charter of Rights
and the Private Sector" (1982) 12 Man. L. J. 213; M. Schumiatcher, "Property and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1988) 1 Can. J. Law & Jur. 189 at 200; B.
Slattery, "Charter ofRights and Freedoms: Does it Bind Private Persons?" (1985) 63
Can. Bar Rev. 148.
Supra note 81.
Fudge, supra note 99; Hutchinson, supra note 22 at c. 5; Trakman, supra note 22 at c.
4.
Y. de Montigny, "Section 32 and Equality Rights" in Bayefsky & Eberts, supra note 23
at 565; Elliott & Grant, supra note 163; The Law of the Charter: General Principles,
supra note 22 at 117; H. Lessard, "The Idea of the 'Private': A Discussion of State
Action Doctrine and Separate Sphere Ideology" in Boyle et al., supra note 23 at 107;
Slattery, supra note 163 at 160-61; Whyte, supra note 162.
J. Cassels, "An Inconvenient Balance: The Injunction as a Charter Remedy" in J.
Berryman, ed., Remedies: Issues and Perspectives (Scarborough: Thompson, 1991) at
271; Fitzgerald, supra note 14; R. Gold, "From Right To Remedy: Putting Equality to
Work" (1989) 14 Queen's L. J. 213.
Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at 86-88.
The phrase is attributed to M. McPhedran by Eberts [M. Eberts, "Sex-Based
Discrimination and the Charter" in Bayefsky & Eberts, supra note 23, 183 at 224] and
was reiterated in R. v. Schachter, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 702.
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rather than making some people better off. However, others have argued that
such judicial activism is of equivocal value because there can be quite negative
spin-off effects. 170 Still others struggle to articulate some middle position that
avoids excessive judicial interventionism while at the same time ensuring
"progressive" outcomes. 17 1
Thus, these examples indicate that middle-order theory appears to be a very
popular form of jurisprudential endeavour.
ii) The Formulation of Working Theory
a) Generally

Twining posits that the jurist who operates at the level of working theory
seeks "to identify, to articulate and to examine critically ..." 1 72 the conceptions
and assumptions of law and legal practice that underlie and inform the juridical
activities of various legal actors, be they lawyers, judges, law reformers or
writers of textbooks. The task of the jurist in this role is: 173
... systematically to examine and bring into the open the working assumptions and operative
ideas of various kinds of participant in legal processes and to examine these critically in
the light of some more general conceptions about the nature of our legal culture and the
actual and potential role of law and lawyers in society.

A great deal of the work by Charter advocates tends to operate at the level
of working theory. The projects of such scholars manifest at least four foci. First,
they seek to broaden the categories of those who can qualify as potential rights
holders under the Charter, for example: gays and lesbians;174 students; 1 75
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Mandel, supra note 8 at 395-99.
N. Duclos & K. Roach, "Constitutional Remedies as 'Constitutional Hints:' A Comment
on R. v. Schachter" (1991) 36 McGill L. Rev. 1; D. Pothier, "Charter Challenges to
Underinclusive Legislation: The Complexities of Sins of Omission" ( 1993) 19 Queen's
L. J. 261; C. Rogerson, "The Judicial Search for Appropriate Remedies Under the
Charter: The Examples of Overbreadth and Vagueness" in Sharpe, supra note 23 at
233.
"Some Jobs for Jurisprudence," supra note 19 at 159.
Ibid. at 159.
A. Bruner, "Sexual Orientation and Equality Rights" in Bayefsky & Eberts, supra note
23 at 457.
A. MacKay, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Springboard to
Students' Rights" (1984) 4 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 174.
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foreigners; 176 refugees; 177 mentally disabled persons; 178 convicted criminals; 1 79
and the "unskilled, unlucky, and unorganized." 180 Secondly, they seek to expand
the scope of rights located in the Charter, for example, a right to food, 181
welfare, 182 nude dancing, 183 and legal aid. 184 Thirdly, rights advocates suggest
reforms that would engender greater public access to the court system. 185
Fourthly, they propose enhanced remedial powers for the judiciary. 186
A significant amount of feminist legal theory may operate at the level of
working theory. Much feminist analysis seeks to take seriously the Charter 's
canonization of liberty, freedom and (especially) equality but then asks why
women as a class seem to be excluded from these constitutional norms. Through
what might be described as a "superliberal strategy," 187 feminists demand that the
specificity of women's egalitarian rights be constitutionally recognized, thereby
facilitating a transformation of the structural and material conditions of women's
existence. 188
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D. Galloway, "The Extraterritorial Application of the Charter to Visa Applicants"
(1991) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 335.
Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at c. 8.
D. Vickers & 0. Endicott, "Mental Disability and Equality Rights" in Bayefsky &
Eberts, supra note 23 at 381.
Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at 175-86; H. Ryan, "The Impact of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the Canadian Correctional System"
(1983) 1 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 99.
Putting the Charter to Work, supra note 22 at 10, 88.
R. Robertson, "The Right to Food - Canada's Broken Covenant" (1989) Can. Hum.
Rts. Y.B. 185.
M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims"
(1993) 19 Queen's L. J. 65. But see Monahan, supra note 22 at 126.
J. Ross, "Nude Dancing and the Charter" (1994) 1 Rev. Const. Studies 298.
M.J. Mossman, 'The Charter and the Right to Legal Aid" (1985) 1 J. L. & Social Pol'y
21; R. Moon, "The Constitutional Right to State Funded Counsel on Appeal" (1989)
14 Queen's L. J. 171.
See, for example, P. Bryden, "Public Interest Intervention in the Courts" (1987) 66 Can.
Bar Rev. 490.
See, for example, Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 13.
R. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1986) at 15-22, 41-42.
See, for example, K. Busby, "LEAF and Pornography: Litigating on Equality and
Sexual Representations" (1994) 9 Can. J. Law & Soc. 165 at 175; M. Eberts, "New
Facts for Old: Observations on the Judicial Process" in Devlin, supra note 4 at 467; P.
Hughes, "Domestic Legal Aid: A Claim to Equality" (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 203;
K. Mahoney, "Canaries in a Coal Mine: Canadian Judges and the Reconstruction of
Obscenity Law" in Schneiderman, supra note 23 at 145; K. Mahoney, "The Limits of
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Some gay and lesbian jurists develop similar inclusionary arguments 189 and
appear to have had juridical success in having sexual orientation included as an
analogous ground under section 15. 190 However, other gay and lesbian scholars
go beyond (heterosexual) feminist scholars, for example, by problematizing the
meaning and structure of "family" and "marriage," and again appear to be having
some possible success. 191
The exercise of developing working theories is programmatic and
prescriptive. It tends to be self-conscious about its aspirations and explicit about
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Liberalism" in Devlin, supra note 4 at 57; K. Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals and the
Law: A Feminist Critique" (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 33; E. Zweibel, "Thibaudeau v.
R. : Constitutional Challenge to the Taxation of Child Support Payments" ( 1994) 4
N.J.C.L. 305; S. Worth Rowley, ''Women, Pensions and Equality" in Boyle et al., supra
note 23 at 283.
J. Jefferson, "Gay Rights and the Charter" (1985) 43 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 70; M. Leopold
& W. King, "Compulsory Heterosexuality, Lesbians and the Law: The Case for
Constitutional Protection" (1985) 1 C.J..W.L. 163; D. Sanders, "Constructing Lesbian
and Gay Rights" (1994) 9 Can. J. Law & Soc. 94; B. Ryder, "Equality Rights and
Sexual Orientation: Confronting Heterosexual Family Privilege" (1990) 9 Can. J. Fam.
L. 39; Stychin, supra note 45; R. Wintemute, "Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination: Same-Sex Couples and the Charter in Mossop, Egan and Layland''
(1994) 39 McGill L. J. 429.
See, for example, Veysey v. Correctional Services of Canada (1989), 29 F.T.R. 74,
(1990) 109 N.R. 300 (F.C.A.); Brown v. British Columbia (Minister ofHealth) (1990),
42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 294; Knodel ·v. B.C. (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 356 (Sup. Ct.); Haig
v. Canada (1992), 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.); Egan and Nesbit v. Queen, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 513. It is to be noted that other lesbians are critical of this "minority rights
paradigm" arguing that it is premised upon a liberal and formal conception of equality
that may be accommodative rather than subversive [G. Brodsky, "Out of the Closet and
Into a Wedding Dress? Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality" (1994) 7
C.J.W.L. 523; Eaton, supra note 39; Herman, supra note 22 at c. 3.] Still others have
argued that the concept of sexual orientation is problematic in that it obscures the
different experiences of gays and lesbians and in the pursuit of greater specificity, a
lesbian legal theory should consider conceptualizing discrimination against lesbians as
sex discrimination [D. Majury, "Refashioning the Unfashionable: Claiming Lesbian
Identities in the Legal Context" (1994) 7 C.J.W.L. 286.] This, in turn, has raised
concerns by other lesbians that such a model may not be inclusive enough, for example,
in relation to lesbians of colour [C. Petersen, "Envisioning a Lesbian Equality
Jurisprudence" in D. Herman & C. Stychin, eds., Legal Inversions (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1995) 118].
Herman, supra note 22 at 145-49; C. Stychin, "Novel Concepts: A Comment on Egan
and Nesbit v. The Queen" (1995) 6 Const. Forum 101. But see M. Eaton,"Patently
Confused: Complex Inequality and Canada v. Mossop" (1993) 1 Rev. Const. Studies
203. See also, N. Duclos, "Some Complicating Thoughts on Same Sex Marriage"
(1991) 1 Law & Sexuality 31.
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its agenda. 192 To illustrate this claim I will first review debates in relation to the
equality provisions and then the Aboriginal provisions of the Charter.

b) Equality Provisions, ss. 1 5, 28.
The equality provisions of the Charter have, perhaps, engendered some of
the most polarised theoretical analyses at the level of working theory. Two sets
of jurisprudential questions arise in this sphere. First, there is the debate over the
meaning of equality. Second, there is the question of how do equality rights
relate to other rights and liberties enshrined in the Charter. Both these questions
can be most fruitfully addressed through a discussion of feminist engagements
with equality. 193
"Equality" is one of those infamous "essentially contested concepts." 194 In
relation to the Charter, three formulations appear to be pervasive in the
literature: formal equality, equality of opportunity, and substantive equality. 195
Formal equality is inspired by an aspiration for universal application. Drawing
on the tradition of Aristotle, formalists posit that those who are the same should
be treated alike, while those who are not the same can be treated differently.
Formal equality is highly individualistic and decontextual in its analysis. 196
Consequently, it focuses its attention on discriminatory practices that are direct
and intentional. Equality of opportunity (or procedural equality) attempts to deal
with indirect and systemic discrimination. It recognizes that not everyone is in
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Eberts et al., supra note 9 at c. 7; M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights
Under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257; MacKay, supra note 110.
Obviously, many other jurists also contribute to the debate on equality. See, for
example, Brudner, supra note 151; The Law of the Charter: Equality Rights, supra note
22; Gold, supra notes 75 and 4; D. Lepofsky, "The Canadian Judicial Approach to
Equality Rights: Freedom Ride or Roller Coaster?" (1991) 1 N.J.C.L. 315; D. Lepofsky
& H.-Schwartz, "An Erroneous approach to the Charter's Equality Guarantee: R. v.
Ertel" ( 1 988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 115; P. Rogers, "Equality, Efficiency and Judicial
Restraint: Towards a Dynamic Constitution" in Boyle et al., supra note 23 at 139.
W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts" (1965) 56 Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Soc. 167.
Other frameworks of analysis have also been proposed. For example, Galloway
suggests that recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions manifest three quite distinct
conceptions of equality: one tied to membership, one tied to the project of equalization
of socially disadvantaged groups, and one tied to human dignity. D. Galloway, ''Three
Models of (In)Equality" (1993) 38 McGill L. J. 64 and, "Strangers and Members:
Equality in an Immigration Setting" (1994) 7 Can. J. Law & Jur. 149.
A. Bayefsky, "Defining Equality Rights Under the Charter" in Mahoney & Martin,
supra note 23 at 106; Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at 81.
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precisely the same position, and, therefore, it considers whether people are
similarly situated either socially, economically or culturally. 197 If so, it advocates
fair play and suggests that some advantages may be given to those who are
disadvantaged so that they may be able to compete in a fair race. 198 However, if
they are not similarly situated they can be treated differently. Substantive
equality (a.k.a. equality of condition or equality of well being) tends to dislike
the race analogy mostly because it is too procedural. 199 Instead, it espouses
eq·uality in the distribution of "social goods."200 Advocates of substantive
equality reject the sameness/difference comparative framework as indeterminate
and ideologically loaded and they eschew a robust public/private dichotomy.
Rather, they take as their starting point inequality, domination and
disadvantage,2°1 and on this foundation emphasize context specific rather than
superficially neutral modes of analysis.202 Consequently, it is argued that we
should focus less on intentions and procedures and more on outcomes and
effects. 203 Viewed through this prism, equality must be understood in a more
caring, contextual and group-sensitive way. 204 In short, substantive equality
favours fair shares and not just fair play. 205

197
198

199
200

201

202
203

204

205

Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice, supra note 22 at 92-94; The Law of the
Charter: Equality Rights, supra note 22 at c. 3.
T. Axworthy, "Liberalism and Equality" in Mahoney & Martin, supra note 23 at 43;
The Law of the Charter: Equality Rights, supra note 22 at c. 7; Monahan, supra note
22 at 127-32.
C. Sheppard, "Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" in Boyle et al., supra note 23 at 195.
Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at 147; L. Trakman, "Substantive Equality in
Constitutional Jurisprudence: Meaning Within Meaning" (1994) 7 Can. J. Law & Jur.
27.
Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at c. 8; K. Lahey, "Feminist Theories of (In)Equality"
in Mahoney & Martin, supra note 23 at 7 1 ; D. Majury, "Equality and Discrimination
According to the Supreme Court of Canada" (1990) 4 C.J.W.L. 407. This view is
developed most fully by Catharine MacKinnon. See, for example, "Making Sex
Equality Real" in Smith, supra note 23 at 37.
Eberts et al., supra note 9 at 21.
Sheppard, supra note 199. See also W. Black, "Intent or Effects: Section 15 of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in Weiler & Elliott, supra note 4 at 120;
"Discrimination and Its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights Under the Charter,"
supra note 110.
C. Boyle & S. Noonan, "Prostitution and Pornography: Beyond Formal Equality" in
Boyle et al., supra note 23 at 225; Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at c. 2 & c. 7; Fudge,
supra note 99 at 496-97; Razack, supra note 88 at 103; Sheppard, supra note 108.
The fair shares/fair play characterization was introduced by the political scientist Jill
Vickers in "Majority Equality Issues of the Eighties" (1983) 1 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 47.
See also Jackman, supra note 182. For an argument that even the fair shares vision is
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These arguments have had critical purchase in a series of recent cases.
Feminists, for example, in order to avoid the Bill ofRights mentality of formal
equality,206 have emphasized not only the affirmative action provisions of section
15(2) and the intei:pretive mandate of section 28,207 but also the expansive
wording of section 1 5(1) and, in particular, the "before and under the law" and
the "equal protection and equal benefit of the law';rovisions.208 Such arguments
were endorsed by the Supreme Court in Brooks 2 when it explicitly overruled
its decision in Bliss 210 decided a inere ten years earlier. Moreover, in Andrews, 2 1 1
Turpin 212 and Butler,213 the Supreme Court also seems to have accepted
arguments by the feminist litigational think tank, LEAF, that the most
appropriate conception of equality is one that rejects formalist and similarly
situated approaches and instead adopts a conception that focuses on
"disadvantage." Such an interpretation is quite closely connected to substantive
conceptions of equality, and shifts the prism of analysis from the
sameness/difference paradigm to a domination/subordination paradigm. 214

206

207
208

209
210
211
212
213
214

too accommodationist and insufficiently transformative, see A. Bartholomew,
"Achieving a Place in a Man's World: Or, Feminism with No Class" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L.
465.
B. Baines, "Law, Gender, Equality" in S. Burt et al., Changing Patterns: Women in
Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993) 243; Brodsky & Day, supra
note 89 at 16, 28.
K. de Jong, "Sexual Equality: Interpreting Section 28" in Bayefsky & Eberts, supra
note 23 at 493.
A. Bayefsky, "Defining Equality Rights" in Bayefsky & Eberts, supra note 23 at 1; W.
Black & L. Smith, "The Equality Rights" in Beaudoin & Ratushney, supra note 17 at
557; Fudge, supra note 99 at 506; M.J. Mossman, "Gender, Equality and the Charter"
in R. Abella, Research Studies of the Commission on Equality in Employment (Ottawa:
Supply and Services, 1985) 299; Sheppard, supra note 199.
Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
Bliss v. A.G. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
Supra note 92.
R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296; (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 8 (S.C.C.)
R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 129.
Eaton, supra note 39 at 133-34; C. Sheppard, "Recognition of the Disadvantaging of
Women: The Promise of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia" (1989) 35
McGill L. J. 206. But see A. Bayefsky, "A Case Comment on the First Three Equality
Rights Cases Under the Canadian: Andrews, Workers' Compensation Reference,
Tupin" (1990) 1 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 503 and D. Gibson, "Equality For Some" (1991)
40 U.N.B.L.J. 2.
Herman argues that even this version of equality may not go far enough because
there is a real danger that the recognition of gay and lesbian equality rights is premised
upon an immutability (or status) argument (as opposed to a choice or conduct argument)
which, in turn, is premised upon an unproblematized assumption of heterosexual
normality. Herman, supra note 22 at c. 3. See also C. Stychin, "Essential Rights and
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Similar feminist analyses appear to have a ripple effect on non-Charter Supreme
Court decisions such as Janzen,215 La.vallee,216 and Moge. 217 Such "victories"
have encouraged other feminists to build upon these breakthroughs to argue for
an enlarged sphere of influence for equality rights.218
This contextual and substantive conception of equality has also had
repercussions for the second category of equality issues: the relationship between
the equality provisions and other rights, liberties and freedoms outlined in the
Charter.219 Feminists have pointed to section 28 (which, they note, cannot be
overridden by section 33) to argue that when read in conjunction with section 15,
equality should be understood as an anchor right which should prevail if it
conflicts with another right.220 This prioritization of equality rights appears to
have been accepted, to some degree, by McIntyre J. in Andrews. 221
Perhaps the classic and most controversial example of such theorizing is to
be found in relation to the pornography debate in which feminist anti-
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Contested Identities: Sexual Orientation and Equality Rights Jurisprudence in Canada"
(1995) 8 Can. J. Law & Jur. 49.
Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. , [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
R. V. Lavallee, [ 1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
Moge v. Moge (1992), 43 R.F.L. (3d) 345 (S.C.C.).
See, for example, C. Boyle, " The Role of Equality in Criminal Law" (1994) 58 Sask.
L. Rev. 203; Jackman, supra note 182 and "Constitutional Contact with the Disparities
in the World: Poverty as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination Under the Canadian
Charter and Human Rights Law" (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 76; H. Lessard,
"Equality and Access to Justice in the Work of Bertha Wilson" (1992) 1 5 Dal. L. J. 35;
C. Sheppard, Study Paper on Litigating the Relationship between Equity and Equality
(Toronto: Ont. L.R.C., 1993).
There are, however, strong indications that this feminist interpretive influence may
have been short-lived. In the recent trilogy of Miron, Egan and Thibaudeau, [ 1995] 2
S.C.R. 418, 513, 627, a majority of the Supreme Court seem to have reconsidered the
appropriateness of the "disadvantaged" approach, and through the idea of "relevancy"
retreated to a similarly situated, sameness of treatment or reasonableness approach to
equality. For a discussion of these cases, see B. Berg, "Fumbling Towards Equality:
Promise and Peril in Egan" (1995) 5 N.J.C.L. 263; D. Pothier, "M' Aider, Mayday:
Section 15 of the Charter in Distress" ( 1996) 6 N.J.C.L. 295; R. Wintemute,
"Discrimination Against Same-sex Couples: Sections 15(1) and 1 of the Charter, Egan
& Nesbit v. Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 682.
L. Clark, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity - and Sorority" in Bayefsky, supra note 43 at
261.
Eberts, supra note 169 at 217-18 arguing that ss. 15 & 28 have priority over ss. 25 &
35. See also de Jong, supra note 207 at 522-23 and P. Hughes, "Feminist Equality and
the Charter: Conflict with Reality?" (1985) 5 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 39.
Supra note 92.
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pornography jurists have invoked the equality rights of sections 1 5 and 28
against the freedom of ex�ression provisions of section 2(b) invoked by
pornographers and liberals. 2 2 Similar patterns of analysis have emerged in the
· sexual assault context where accused men have claimed that the rape shield
provisions of the Criminal Code violate their right to a fair trial under section 1 1
and feminists have replied that these are trumped by sections 1 5 and 28. 223
Clearly, feminists have been crucial and influential formulators of working
theory. 224
222

223
224

M. Alexander, "Censorship and the Limits of Liberalism" (1988) 47 U.T. Fae. L. Rev.
58; L. Arbour, "The Politics of Pornography: Towards an Expansive Theory of
Constitutionally Protected Expression" in Weiler & Elliott, supra note 4 at 294; Busby,
supra note 188 at 183; P. Hughes, "Pornography: Alternatives to Censorship" (1985)
9 Can. J. Pol. & Soc. Theory 96; K. Lahey, "The Charter and Pornography: Toward a
Restricted Theory of Constitutionally Protected Expression" in Weiler & Elliott, supra
note 4 at 265; ''The Canadian Charter of Rights and Pornography: Toward a Theory of
Actual Gender Equality" (1984-1985) 20 New England L.R. 649; K. Mahoney,
"Obscenity, Morals and the Law: A Feminist Critique" (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 33.
See also D. Dyzenhaus, "Pornography and Public Reason" (1994) 7 Can. J. Law & Jur.
261.
Parallel arguments were also developed in the context of anti-hate propaganda
legislation, and again the argument that s. 15 (this time in conjunction with s. 27)
trumps, seems to have been persuasive in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. See, for
example, K. Mahoney, "R. v. Keegstra: A Rationale for Regulating Pornography?"
(1992) 37 McGill L. J. 242. However, the argument seems to have failed in R. v. Zundel
(1992), 95 D.L.R. (4th) 202 (S.C.C.): See also the important intervention by R. Moon,
"Drawing Lines in a Culture of Prejudice: R. v. Keegstra and the Restriction of Hate
Propaganda" (1992) 26 U.B.C.L. Rev. 99.
For a discussion see E. Sheehy, "Canadian Judges and the Law of Rape: Should the
Charter Insulate Bias?" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 741.
The feminist embracement of equality discourse has also had an impact on other areas.
For example, LEAF intervened in Canadian Newspapers Co. Ltd. v. Canada (A. G.)
(1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 24 (S.C.C.) to argue against the corporate plaintiffs claim that
its entitlement to freedom of expression was infringed by the prohibition in the Criminal
Code against the publication of the names of victims of sexual assault if the victim
requested. The Court, at least indirectly, accepted the equalitarian argument of LEAF
that this provision was justifiable because violence against women inhibits their social
equality and that anonymity is essential to encourage r�porting of sexual assaults.
LEAF's factum in Borowski v. Canada (A.G.) (1989), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), also
attempted to conceptualize abortion as an equality issue, while a similar analysis was
unsuccessfully argued in relation to standing in Canadian Council of Churches v.
Canada (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 193. See S. McIntyre, "Above and Beyond Equality
Rights: Canadian Council ofChurches v. The Queen" (1992) 12 Windsor Y.B. Access
Just. 293.
Substantive equality analysis has also loomed large in feminist jurists discussions
of constitutional reform. For example, Baines has argued against the Meech Lake
Accord because of the dangers it posed for women's equality rights. B. Baines, "An
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However, not all feminists have been as optimistic as either liberal feminists
in their accommodation to the "paradigm shift" engendered by the Charter,225 or
radical feminist deviations with, and revolutionary reconstructions of, the
Charter.226 For examEle, some feminists have queried just how flexible Charter
language might be2 7 and identified just how channelling and constraining
constitutional discourse can be.228 Others have highlighted the way in which the
equality and other provisions of the Charter have been used against women
thereby forcing feminist organizations into problematic and expensive defensive
strategies.229 Hess230 and Seaboye?-31 are invoked as examples of the trumping
argument failing miserably.232 So too might Daviault.233 Other observers have
identified the dangers inherent in the "categorization game" and have argued that
the courts (and indeed feminists themselves) appear to be unable to deal with
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Alternative Vision of the Meech Lake Accord" (1988) 13 Queen's L. J. 1.
R. Abella, 'The Dynamic Nature of Equality" in Mahoney & Martin, supra note 23 at
3; Clark, supra note 39; K. Mahoney, ''The Constitutional Law of Equality in Canada"
(1992) 44 Maine L. Rev. 229; L. Smith, "A New Paradigm for Equality Rights" in
Smith et al., supra note 23 at 353, "Adding a Third Dimension: The Canadian
Approach to Constitutional Equality Guarantees" (1992) 55 Law & Contemp. Prob.
211.
Busby, supra note 188; Razack, supra note 88 at 104, 107, 126.
S. Noonan, "Harm Revisited: R. v. Butler" (1992) 4 Const. Forum 12.
P. Hughes, "The Morgentaler Case: Law as Political Tool" in E. Bennett, ed., Social
Intervention: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987) at 255; E.
Sheehy, "Feminist Argumentation before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme: The Sound of One Hand Clapping" (1991) 18 Melbourne U.L.
Rev. 450.
Brodsky & Day, supra note 89; M. Eaton & C. Petersen "Case Comment: Andrews v.
Ontario (Minister of Health)" (1987) 2 C.J.W.L. 416; Fudge, supra note 99; Fudge,
supra note 86; Petter, supra note 103.
R. v. Hess and Nguyen, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
Fudge & Glasbeek, supra note 39 at 54; L. MacDonald, "Promoting Social Equality
through the Legislative Override" (1994) 4 N.J.C.L. 1 ; D. Majury, "Seaboyer and
Gayme: A Study In Equality" in J. Roberts & R. Mohr, Confronting Sexual Assault: A
Decade ofLegal and Social Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 268;
Sheehy, supra note 228. But see C. Boyle & M. MacCrimmon, "R. v. Seaboyer: A Lost
Cause?" (1992) 7 C.R. (4th) 225; S. Mclntyre,"Redefining Reformism: The
Consultations that Shaped Bill C-49" in Roberts & Mohr, ibid. 293; E. Shilton & A.
Derrick, "Sex Equality and Sexual Assault: In the Aftermath of Seaboyer" (1991) 11
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 107.
R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
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complex and overlapping identities, for example, on the basis of race, class or
sexual orientation.234
Similar debates have been generated by feminist adaptations of section 7, the
liberty principle, explicitly in the example of Wilson J.' s decision in
Morgentaler,235 and how in reality such an approach may not necessarily
improve women's access to abortion because it reconstitutes the public/private
dichotomy236 and relies on quite problematic liberal assumptions. 237
Moreover, Mary Ellen Turpel challenges both the cultural imperialism of the
Charter framework and, specifically, the discourse of gender equality. Invoking
Audre Lourde' s famous aphorism that "the master's tools cannot dismantle the
master's house," she argues in obvious rebuttal to some feminist analyses238 that
equality is "simply not the central organizing political principle" of First Nations
communities.239 Instead, she advocates in favour of cultural self-determination
and suggests that the _problem of "patronage is not universal."240 Thus, for
Turpel, sexism within the First Nations communities is a by-product of
colonialism that can only be remedied once "cultural" self-determination has
been addressed. Poignantly, she argues that because many white feminists favour
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Bartholomew, supra note 205; N. Iyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the
Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 Queen's L. J. 179. See also, J. Bakan et al.,
"Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1993-1994 Term" (1995) 6 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.
(2d) 67; M. Eaton, "Patently Confused: Complex Inequality and Canada v. Mossop"
(1993) 1 Rev. Const. Studies 203; L. Philips & M. Young, "Sex, Tax and the Charter:
A Review of Thibaudeau v. Canada" (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 221; Sheehy, supra
note 228; C. Stychin, "Essential Rights and Contested Identities: Sexual Orientation and
Equality Rights Jurisprudence in Canada" (1995) 8 Can. J. Law & Jur. 49.
R. v. Morgentaler, [ 1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. See, for example, L. Smith, "Adding a Third
Dimension: The Canadian Approach to Constitutional Equality Guarantees" (1992) 55
Law & Contemp. Problems 211 at 230-31; L. Weinrib, "The Morgentaler Judgment:
Constitutional Rights, Legislative Intention, and Institutional Design" (1992) 42
U.T.L.J. 22.
Fudge, supra note 99 at 544; H. Lessard, "Creation Stories: Social Rights and Canada's
Social Contract" in Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note 23 at 101, 110-11; See also
Bogart, supra note 22 at 152-53.
B. Cossrnan, "The Precarious Unity of Feminist Theory and Practice: The Praxis of
Abortion" (1986) 44 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 85.
Eberts, supra note 169 and de Jong, supra note 207.
M.E. Turpel, "Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for First
Nations Women" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 174 at 180.
Ibid.
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state intervention and a "preconceived notion of gender equality,"241 they may
run the danger of paternalism in relation to First Nations women. 242
This debate provides a useful bridge to the second domain of working theory,
the Aboriginal provisions.
c) Aboriginal Provisions
There is little within the Charter itself that relates to First Nations people.
Although First Nations lobbied in the early 1980s for a constitutional declaration
that their original rights under treaties and the Royal Proclamation of 1763
should be reinstated, federal and provincial procrastination thwarted such
demands. In lieu, all that the First Nations were able to attain within the Charter
was section 25, a saving provision which instructs judges not to interpret the
Charter "so as to abrogate or derogate from any Aboriginal, treaty or other rights
or freedoms that pertain to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada." Although they are
not part of the Charter, I think that sections 35 and 37 are also relevant in that
they have a direct impact upon debates around the Charter. Section 35
"recognizes and affirms ... existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada." Section 37 provides for a series of First Ministers
conferences on Aboriginal affairs, a process which, from the First Nations
perspective, achieved very little. 243 Finally, section 1 5, the generic equality
provision, also applies to First Nations peoples.244
Most of the scholarship on the Aboriginal provisions tends to be doctrinal.
These prophylactic efforts attempt to make sense of the deeply ambiguous
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Ibid. at 188.
For an attempt to mediate these two apparently contradictory positions by focusing on
s. 35(4) see D. Greschner, "Aboriginal Women, the Constitution and Criminal Justice"
(1992) U.B.C. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 338.
Francophone feminists have expressed a similar argument in the context of the
relationship between the distinct society clause of the Meech Lake Accord and the
Charter when many Anglo feminists feared that their equality rights were in danger.
M. Turpel, "The Charlottetown Discord and Aboriginal Peoples' Struggle for
Fundamental Political Change" in K. McRoberts & P. Monahan, The Charlottetown
Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1993) at 117.
Sanders suggests that s. 27 might also have some indirect influence. D. Sanders,
"Article 27 and the Aboriginal People's of Canada" in Multiculturalism and the
Charter, supra note 23 at 155.
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sections so as to enhance potential rights claims by the First Nations. 245
Surprisingly, section 25 has generated very little jurisprudential analysis.246
However section 35 has encouraged several scholars to articulate some broader
working theory of its effect: that it entrenches a constitutional trust;247 that it
signifies a constitutional commitment of honour;248 that it operates as a distinct
and special Charter for Aboriginal peoples;249 or more radically still, that it is a
constitutional acknowledgement of an already existing, continuing and inherent
(as opposed to contingent) right of self determination/government. 250 These
readings, in turn, have led some authors to argue that there is a constitutional
mandate to recognize and promote culturally-specific Aboriginal criminal justice
systems. 251

It was the decision in Sparrow,252 however, which most obviously has
cranked the jurisprudential mill. In particular, jurists have concentrated on the

Supreme Court' s determination that although section 35 recognized the sui
generis nature of Aboriginal rights, such rights were still subject to a
reasonableness standard analogous to that of section 1 , even though section 1
does not apply to section 35 because the latter is not part of the Charter. This has
raised important questions about appropriate judicial interpretive method,
paternalism, colonialism, conceptions of the rule of law and sovereignty, judicial
supremacism, and equality (of peoples).253
245
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See, for example, K. McNeil, ''The Constitution Act, 1982, Sections 25 and 35" (1988)
1 C.N.L.R. 1; W. Pentney, supra note 112; D. Sanders, "The Rights of the Aboriginal
Peoples of Canada" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 314; B. Slattery, "The Constitutional
Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (1982) 8 Queen's L. J. 232.
But see Pentney, ibid.
B. Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can.
Bar Rev. 261.
Lyon, supra note 72 at 101.
Lyon, supra note 38 at 243, 246.
J. Borrows, "A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self
Government" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L. J. 291; "Constitutional Law from a First
Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation" (1994) 28 U.B.C.L.
Rev. 1; B. Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Aboriginal Right of
Self-Government in Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1990); M. Asch & P. Macklem, "Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An
Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 498.
See, for example, P. Macklem, "Aboriginal Peoples, Criminal Justice Initiatives and the
Constitution" (1992) U.B.C. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 280.
(1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 263 (S.C.C.).
Asch & Macklem, supra note 250; W Binnie, ''The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the
End or End of the Beginning?" (1990) 15 Queen's L. J. 217; Clark, supra note 250 at
201; Macklem, supra note 110; K. McNeil, "Envisaging Constitutional Space for
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At the most profound political and jurisprudential level, some have argued
that the Charter is deeply problematic from a First Nations perspective not only
because it was imposed upon First Nations peoples without consent,254 but also
because it represents modes of thought and social relations that are said to be
incompatible with the aspiration for self-determination. There is also the
problem of the rights of internal minorities. 255 This is exemplified, as already
noted, in the debate about the relationship between self-government/
determination, gender and race and whether equality (and indeed which version
of equality256) should be seen as the trumping constitutional norm. 257 Such con
cerns have surfaced most recently in relation to the Charlottetown Accord
whereby First Nations were recognized as constituting a "third order of
government," possessing significant powers for self-government. 258 Most
importantly, the Accord acknowledged that First Nations could potentially avoid
the application of the Charter on the basis of the incommensurability argument.
This exclusion caused concern among some Aboriginal women who argued
(contrary to Turpel' s position259) that they required the protection of the equality
provisions of the Charter against potential sexual discrimination within the
Aboriginal community.260 Recently, it has been suggested that one way to resolve
this apparent jurisprudential impasse would be to develop parallel Aboriginal
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Aboriginal Governments" (1993) 19 Queen's L. J. 95.
L. Green, "Aboriginal Peoples, International Law and the Canadian Charter ofRights
and Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 339 at 350.
L. Green, "Internal Minorities and Their Rights" in J. Baker, ed., Group Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 101.
Greschner, supra note 242.
W. Moss, "Indigenous Self-Government in Canada and Sexual Equality under the
Indian Act: Resolving Conflicts Between Collective and Individual Rights" (1990) 15
Queen's L. J. 279; D. Sanders, 'The Renewal of Indian Special Status" in Bayefsky &
Eberts, supra note 23 at 529.
Webber, supra note 22 at 170-72.
Supra note 66. For Turpel's reply see supra note 243 at 132-35.
T. Nahanee, "Dancing with a Gorilla: Aboriginal Women, Justice and the Charter" in
Aboriginal Peoples and the Justice System (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993) at 359.
For discussions see J. Green, "Constitutionalising the Patriarchy: Aboriginal Women
and Aboriginal Government" (1993) 4 Const. Forum 110; T. Isaac & M. Maloughney,
"Dually Disadvantaged and Historically Forgotten?: Aboriginal Women and the
Inherent Right of Aboriginal Self-Government" (1992) 21 Man. L. J. 453; R.
Sigurdson, "The Left-Legal Critique of the Charter: A Critical Assessment" (1993) 13
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 117 at 136-37.
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Charters of Rights reflecting First Nations' worldviews.261 The lack of specificity
of such proposals· at this point in time makes it difficult to determine if the
incommensurability problem can be resolved.
In sum, what these various examples of working theory suggest is that
contemporary Canadian jurists believe that legal doctrine matters, but that
doctrine is not simply a matter of rules. Rather, legal doctrine is inevitably
dependent upon juridically significant background assumptions and social
visions and that the role of the legal theorist is to engage in the articulation of
these assumptions and visions, to translate needs and aspirations into juridical
form.
E. The Synthesizing Function
In a sense, the synthesizing function can be understood as a method of taking
stock, of creating an inventory of where legal thought is at. Twining' s preferred
metaphor here is that of a map. In this realm, the function of the jurist is: 262
to chart, and where appropriate, to redesign the general map of the intellectual milieu of
the law ... to explore and articulate general frames of reference for law as an academic
discipline.

In the Charter context, particularly in relation to interpretive .theories and
politico-juridical positioning, a host of authors have attempted to map the field:
Bakan and Beatty are manichean, splitting the terrain between sceptics and
believers;263 Weiler identifies pure-market libertarians (a non-existent breed in
Canada), liberal romantics, radical cynics, and pragmatic pluralists;264
Etherington talks about realists, liberal romantics, and liberal pragmatists;265
while Herman spotlights debunkers, promoters, reactionaries, and pragmatists.266
The present essay would probably fall into this category.
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See, for example, M. Turpel & P. Hogg, "Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government:
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Issues" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 187, 213-16; Isaac
& Maloughney, ibid.
"Some Jobs for Jurisprudence," supra note 19 at 160.
Bakan, supra note 4; Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at 244.
Weiler, supra note 84.
Etherington, supra note 4.
Herman, supra note 4.
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F. The Ideological Function
This is not a job for legal theory as is expressly addressed by Twining,
although he does make one cursory comment on suggestions by "radical jurists"
as to the legitimation function of jurisprudence.267 What I am a trying to suggest
here is the role that jurists can play in identifying the intersections between law
and power, and the way in which law and lawyers (in which category I include
legal academics) both constitute and are constituted by such power. More
particularly, this category will help us to identify the stances that legal theorists
take when they come to terms with such intersections.268 Thus, while on one
level it might have been appropriate to treat this category as a sub-category of the
conduit function insofar as it draws clearly on insights from other disciplines,
such an approach would deflate the question of the importance the ideological
dimensions of jurisprudence.
The concept of "ideology" is, of course, indeterminate. Generally, however,
it can be understood as a prism through which one comes to terms with the
relationship between ideas and reality. More precisely, and factoring in the
crucial variable of power, there is a helpful insight to be called from Thompson's
proposition that "[t]o study ideology ... is to· study the wais in which meaning
(or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination." 69 In other words, the
concept of ideology enables us to think about the way in which our modes of
thought (re)present and filter material practices and experiences to us. Ideology
takes seriously the relationship between knowledge and power notjust in the
sense that to have knowledge is to-have power, but more in the sense that power
relations constitute the nature, quality, categories and parameters of the
knowledge that is available. This is particularly important for jurisprudence (and
in particular Charter jurisprudence) because legal theory is not only passive and
disinterested reflection on the nature and function of law; rather, it is, as the
Australian jurist Valerie Kerruish argues, a proactive meaning disseminating
practice, a cultural product.270 Thus, in this section I want to suggest that those
who have proclaimed "the end of ideology"271 have been premature, at least in
the context of Anglophone Canadian legal theory.
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Ideologies can operate in a variety of ways. In its crudest form, ideology is
associated with ideas of a conspiracy thesis through which the dominant elites
maintain their power, not only by direct force but also by the process of
inculcating in the oppressed classes a false consciousness. Few Charter scholars
support such a conspiracy thesis. 272 A more cautious version suggests that such
are the formative contexts of judges that they almost inevitably identify with and
legitimize the perspectives of the elite of Canadian society.273 Charter decisions,
particularly in the realm of labour law, have provided a great deal of data to
support such analyses. 274
The debate over whether property/economic rights can or should be included
·as Charter rights is a good example of where the competing ideologies surface.
While some argue in favour of such rights because property is in essence a
natural right, liberty' s "siamese twin,"275 others concur because it may provide
minimum opportunities and rights for the dispossessed. 276 Others are opposed to
locating such rights in the Charter either because it smacks of illegitimate
judicial activism,277 or because of the dangers of further enhancing corporate
power in Canada. 278 Similar ideological divisions are manifest in the debates
over constitutionally protecting commercial expression under section 2(b). 279
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Similarly, it could be suggested that the debates on the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the section 33 override provision (the technical legal questions
of its relationship to section I and whether a court can review a legislature's
invocation of the section procedurally or substantively) necessitates an
articulation of competing conceptions of democracy. 280 Moreover, it brings into
particularly sharp relief the differences between those whose primary fidelity is
to a deontological and individualistic worldview and those _who subscribe to a
more communitarian and majoritarian worldview. 281
A more subtle theory still of ideology, argues in favour of false necessity
analysis, that is, that ideology functions best by portraying certain beliefs as
natural, inevitable, self-evident and therefore unchallengeable. 282 Such
necessitariariism is, in Bourdieu's terms, "doxa," a belief structure that so closely
dovetails with common sense that it seems absurd to even question it. 283
Alternative ideas, practices or modes of social interaction are simply
unimaginable and inconceivable. Examples might be the assumption that
individual rights are by definition a good thing,284 the presupposition that the
individual is the foundational unit of social analysis285 or the belief that
constitutional decision making is principled rather than political. 286
"Heterodoxy" occurs when someone challenges the self-evidence of such
truisms as to the virtue of individual rights. Heterodox jurists, as we have seen,
advance several arguments against Charter ideology and discourse. "Orthodoxy"
is a response to heterodoxy's challenge to doxa, the articulation of justifications
for that which had formerly been taken for granted. Schwartz's rejection of
Aboriginal rights claims is a good example of such orthodoxy287 as are Smith's
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D. Greschner & K. Norman, ''The Courts and Section 33" (1987) 12 Queen's L. J. 155.
See also S. Scott, "Entrenchment by Executive Action: A Partial Solution to
'Legislative Override'" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 303; B. Slattery, "Override Clauses
Under Section 33" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 391; J. Whyte. "On Not Standing for
Notwithstanding" (1990) 28 Alta. L. Rev. 347.
Compare, for example, Weinrib, supra note 71 and P. Weiler, "The Evolution of the
Charter: A View from the Outside" in Weiler & Elliott, supra note 4 at 49.
R.M. Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of
Radical Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory ofPractice (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1977).
See, for example, Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin, supra note 23.
B. Schwartz, supra note 111.
See, for example, Putting the Charter to Work, supra note 22.
Schwartz, supra note 111.
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pragmatism in defense of feminist struggles with the equality provisions,288
Dyzenhaus' egalitarian. liberalism,289 and Slattery' s transcendent but practical
defence of judicial decision making. 290
The collective rights debate provides a useful illustration of this discursive
spiral of doxa, heterodoxy and orthodoxy. Historically, within a liberal
dominated frame of reference, it has been assumed that in their nature and by
definition rights are essentially individualistic, and, therefore, any conception of
group rights is simply nonsensical.29 1 This would be doxa. However, as already
discussed, over the last decade or so there have been increasing demands for the
recognition of collective rights. 292 This might be heterodoxy. In reply, liberals
have been forced to give reasons why there should be no recognition of
collective rights, why rights should be preserved to an individualistic
paradigm. 293 This is orthodoxy.294
Gramsci' s thoughts on "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals might also
have some purchase in an analysis of the ideological context of Charter
scholarship.295 Traditionally, intellectuals have tended to be contemplative
thinkers, scholars in the idealist tradition who seek a truth uncontaminated by
politics, experience, identity or other partisan variables. The goal is the pursuit
of objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality. Organic intellectuals, by contrast,
deny the possibility of ever achieving such a "view from nowhere" to advocate
the contrary argument that theory and experience are mutually constitutive. As
members of oppressed social classes, they emphasize the pervasiveness of
• perspectivism and, as self-conscious representatives of their social group, they
strive to articulate the world view or vision that captures the standpoint or
288
289
290
291
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L. Smith, "Have the Equality Rights Made Any Difference?" in Bryden, supra note 23
at 60.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 109.
B. Slattery, "Are Constitutional Cases Political?" (1989) 11 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 507.
Jacobs, supra note 128.
Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note 23; Johnston, supra note 112; W. Kymlicka,
Liberalism, Community, and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); D.
Reaume, "The Group Right to Linguistic Security: Whose Right, What Duties?" in
Baker, supra note 255 at 118; Trakman, supra note 22 at c. 3.
See, for example, P. Benson, "The Priority of Abstract Right, Constructivism, and the
Possibility of Collective Rights in Hegel's Legal Philosophy" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law &
Jur. 257; Hartney supra note 124; Narveson supra note 130.
See, for example, L. Weinrib et al., "Legal Analysis of the Draft Legal Text of October
12, 1992" (unpublished manuscript).
A. Gramsci, Selections From Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York:
International Publishers, 1972) at 5-23.
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location that they represent. Organic intellectuals criticise the purism of the
traditionalists as theoreticist and, therefore, complicitous in the perpetuation of
oppressive social relations. Instead, organic intellectuals advocate a
transformativist conception of theory: that the only legitimate purpose of theory
is to help advance progressive political practice.296 Examples of such organic
jurists might include advocates of lesbian and gay rights,297 First Nations
spokespersons, 298 people of colour, 299 disability rights activists, 300 or feminist
practitioners. 301 It is more difficult to identify organic intellectuals on the basis
of their class, because by the time one reaches the heady plateau of
jurisprudence, one has more than likely become a member of the middle class
and therefore is distanced from the working class community. 302
To my mind, there is little doubt that Charter jurisprudence is deeply
saturated in ideology, not just in the sense that some scholars make explicit their
ideological preferences, but also in the sense that all scholarship is premised
upon pervasive normative visions (whether they are articulated or not). In the
next section I will indicate that this is a good thing.
EVALUATIVE COMMENTS

V.

My aim in this paper has not been to distribute bouquets and brickbats to
individual scholars. Consequently, in this section, in my attempt to analyze the
relationship between the Charter and legal theory, I will: a) identify and discuss
what are some of the more positive patterns that have emerged in Charter
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In this sense, at least they are the heirs of Marx's XI thesis on Fuerbach: "The
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it."
See L.D. Easton & K.H. Sudat, eds., Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and
Society (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967) at 402. See also, E. Gross, "What
is Feminist Theory?" in Pateman C. and Gross E., Feminist Challenges: Social and
Political Theory (Boston: Northeastern U. Press, 1987) at 1 90 .
Herman, supra note 22; C. Stychin, "A Postmodern Constitutionalism: Equality Rights,
Identity Politics, and the Canadian National Imagination" (1994) 17 Dalhousie L. J. 6 1 .
Borrows, supra note 250; Johnston, supra note 1 1 2; Turpel, supra note 66.
Iyer, supra note 234.
D. Lepofsky, "The Canadian Judicial Approach to Equality Rights: Freedom Ride or
Roller Coaster?" ( 1991 ) N.J.C.L. 3 1 5; Pothier, supra note 2 1 8 .
Eberts et al., supra note 9 at 3-4; Eberts, supra note 1 88; Lahey, supra note 222;
Mahoney, supra note 1 88.
But see Fudge and Glasbeek' s spirited defence of class analysis in the face of identity
jurisprudence, supra note 39 and Mandel, supra note 8 whose work is heavily
influenced by a class analysis.
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jurisprudence� and b) briefly highlight some problems that may be worth further
consideration.
A. Positive Patterns
The Charter may have done more for legal theory than legal theory has done
for the Charter. Historically, legal theory has had a marginal existence in law
and the legal academy, a poor relation in a family whose primary ambition has
been to provide services to the social elites, balanced with a few philanthropic
forays such as legal aid clinics or courses on poverty and welfare law. However,
because of the manifestly social and political nature of legal decision-making in
a Charter regime, the traditional gambits for rendering law autonomous and
insular are no longer available. This has meant that legal theory as a practice has
gained increasing legitimacy in legal circles as witnessed, for example, in even
a few references to jurists by members of the Supreme Court. 303 It is important,
however, not to overstate the instrumental significance of legal theory. Despite
some calls from the judiciary for greater theoretical assistance304 and even the
explicit invocation of jurisprudential perspectives on occasion, it seems to me
that jurisprudence remains relatively unimportant. For example, even though the
decision in Dolphin Delivery305 has received universal academic criticism from
a number of very diverse jurisprudential perspectives, the Supreme Court seems
to be adamant in its refusal to reconsider its position.
More generally, it might be suggested that Charter theory has to some degree
escaped the clutches of analytical positivism. Few scholars now invoke the
discourse of natural law and legal positivism. 306 Consequently, legal theory
appears to have become significantly more interdisciplinary and to have
undergone a radical regeneration of interest. There has been a proliferation of
more junior scholars whose work is explicitly and self-consciously
jurisprudential. In short, the Charter has gone some way in liberating Canadian
legal scholarship from what Alan Hunt has described as the "dark-age of 'black
letter' law"307 or what I would call the dull compulsion of the doctrinal.
303
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See, for example, Wilson J.' s decisions in Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985]
I S.C.R. 441 at 460, and MacDonald v. City of Montreal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460 at 51524.
See, for example, Dickson C.J., supra note I .
Supra note 81.
But see Hogg, supra note 141 and B. Strayer, "Life Under the Canadian Charter:
Adjusting the Balance Between Legislatures and Courts" (1988) Public Law 347.
A. Hunt, "Jurisprudence, Philosophy and Legal Education - Against Foundationalism:
A Response to Neil MacCormick" ( 1 986) 6 Legal Studies 292 at 296.
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Closely related to this, there seems to be a sense that theory is not significant
for theory's own sake, but that it is important because of its utility in advancing
one's normative viewpoint.308 More specifically, the literature seems to suggest
that the vast majority of Canadian jurists tend to fall between the liberal and the
left end of the political continuum. Thus, debates have tended to involve those
who, very roughly, might be called the liberal egalitarian democrats309 and the
radical progressives.
However, two further points may be worth noting here. First, unlike political
science or philosophy,3 10 within legal circles, few jurists adopt an explicitly
right- wing orientation. Law and economics discourse, while influential in other
aspects of Canadian jurisprudential life, has only had a marginal influence on
Charter theory.311 The National Citizens Coalition and REAL Women, for
example, appear to be without a jurisprudential spokesperson (so far). 3 12
Second, although I have suggested that the debate has tended to revolve
around disputes between liberal egalitarians and radical progressives this should
308
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310
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One manifestation of this is that there appears to be a bona fide effort on the part of
many legal theorists to attempt to make their jurisprudential arguments as accessible as
possible. In part this may be connected to the contextualizing shift in much
jurisprudence. Constitutional Forum, with its preference for short, pithy articles and
comments is a particularly good example of the attempt to disseminate legal theory. See
also D. Schneiderman, ed., Conversations Among Friends (Edmonton: Centre for
Constitutional Studies, 1 99 1 ). ·For a rejection of this politicization of theory see B.
Langille, "Political World" ( 1 989) 3 Can J. L. & Jur. 1 39.
Gibson, for example, describes his work as reflective of the "radical or principled
middle." The Law of the Charter: General Principles, supra note 22 at iv-v.
See A. Dobrowolsky, "The Charter and Mainstream Political Science: Waves of
Practical Contestation and Changing Theoretical Currents" in D. Schneiderman & K.
Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Law
and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at 1 16. See also R. Sharpe, "Mootness,
Abstract Questions and Alternative Grounds: Deciding Whether to Decide" in Sharpe,
supra note 23 at 327; T. Lee & M. Trebilcock, "Economic Mobility and Constitutional
Reform" (1 987) 37 U.T.L.J. 268.
But see R. Martin, "Bill C-49: A Victory for Interest Group Politics" ( 1993) 42
U.N.B.L.J. 357 and Martin & Hawkins, supra note 35. Although I do not subscribe to ·
the currently popular view that left-right distinctions are passe, there are times when
there appears to be a certain commonality between some on the legal left and those on
the political right, particularly with regard to criticisms of the antidemocratic nature of
judicial review. See, for example, Bogart, supra note 22 at 1 48-49 who is not only
ambivalent about distinctions between "socialism and toryism," but who also invokes
the American papal apologist Mary Ann Glendon in his partial critique of the
Morgentaler decision. See also Mandel, supra note 8 at 73.
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not be mistaken for a claim that the latter group espouse a uniform position.
Rather there have been fractionalizations over time. While there are some
holdouts who insist that the Charter is incapable of being hijacked for
progressive ends,3 1 3 there are now strong signs of left revisionism which
advocates a more nuanced position which may allow for Charter mobilization,
depending upon the issues. 3 1 4
Two examples might illustrate this fractionalization among progressives.
Some on the left have argued in favour of a Social Charter as a defence
mechanism against the rightward shift in Canadian politics, whereas others have
argued that such a strategy is simply symbolic soft law that firetends to advance
real human needs while in fact achieving nothing concrete. 15 Similarly, within
the feminist movement there have been pointed disagreements over, for
example, tax deductions on the basis of gender and race,3 16 pornography, 3 17
prostitution,3 1 8 the most appropriate vision of equality319 and, indeed, the appro
priateness of litigational politics at all. Similarly, there have been lesbian
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Mandel, supra note 8 at 3, 47, 457-61.
See, for example, Fudge, supra note 99 at 497-98; Herman, supra note 22 and
Hutchinson, supra note 22 who seems to have made significant alterations in his stance.
Originally, Hutchinson appeared to be totally opposed to Charter based arguments. See
A. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the
Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278 at 279. Now, in the light of Andrews and Morgentaler,
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generally, R. Devlin, "Some Recent Developments in Canadian Constitutional Theory
with Particular Reference to Beatty and Hutchinson" (1996) 22 Queen's L. J. 8 1 . See
also Fudge, supra note 93 for a similar critique.
See generally, Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note 23; Mandel, supra note 8 at 109-15,
1 23.
Iyer, supra note 234; A. Macklin, "Symes v. M.N.R.: Where Sex Meets Class" (1992)
5 C.J.W.L. 498; C. Young, "Child Care and the Charter: Privileging the Privileged"
(1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 20.
K. Busby, "LEAF and Pornography: Litigating on Equality and Sexual Represen
tations" (1994) 9 Can. J. Law & Soc. 165; K. Lahey, supra note 222; K. Mahoney,
"Obscenity, Morals and the Law: A Feminist Critique" ( 1 985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 33;
V. Burstyn, ed., Women A gainst Censorship (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1985).
J. Dickin McGinnis, ''Whores and Worthies: Feminism and Prostitution" (1994) 9 Can.
J. Law & Soc. 105.
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critiques of both (heterosexual) feminist jurisprudence and (gay dominated)
sexual orientation jurisprudence. 320
At least three interpretations can be advanced as to the significance of this
pluralization of progressive voices. First, it might be suggested that many
progressive jurists have adopted a position of Derridean undecidability thereby
relinquishing grand theories in favour of more localized and context sensitive
politico-juridical strategizing. 321 Alternatively, one might conjecture that the
Charter debates il_lustrate yet another failure to consolidate solidarity among
progressives,322 and that radical jurists have been overwhelmed by a discursive
regime that is undesirable, but unavoidable. 323 As a consequence, it could be
argued that while the left are all over the map in terms of what to do about the
Charter, conservative and corporate forces have (apparently without a great deal
of jurisprudential reinforcement or direction) seized the opportunity created by
the Charter and effectively pursued a regressive politico-juridical agenda. Third,
and less pessimistically, one could interpret debates among progressive jurists
not on the basis of their impact on social and judicial policymaking, but focus
more upon the quality of the debates themselves. Viewed in this light, there is
no doubt that progressive legal theory is blossoming in Canada and that there is
an openness and spirit of engagement that is heartening. 324
To me this fractionalization suggests a certain irony. Debates within
contemporary literary criticism in the last decade or so have tended to suggest
that we must confront the death of the author thesis, that is, that authorial intent
is of quite limited significance. and that what is crucial is the · reader's
320
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For discussions see, for example, Eaton, supra note 39; D. Herman, "A Jurisprudence
of One's Own? Ruthann Robson's Lesbian Legal Theory" (1994) 7 C.J.W.L. 509;
Majury, supra note 190.
Herman is probably the clearest example of this position supra note 22 at 8, supra note
4 at 603 but so too is Fudge who, despite her differences with Herman, admits that the
Charter may mean very different things to unions and feminists, supra note 93.
Such a view would challenge DeCoste's argument that in spite of strong differences
between many progressives, "there are two, and only two, positions possible with
respect to the relationship between law and life - a liberationist/ transformative
position, and a non-liberationist/reformative position." DeCoste, supra note 4 at 946.
See, for example, Hutchinson's excessively harsh critique of Conklin, supra note 22 at
75-84 or the debate between Fudge and Glasbeek, supra note 39 and Herman, supra
note 39.
Fudge, supra note 99 at 458; Fudge & Glasbeek, supra note 39; Hutchinson, supra note
· 22 at xiii, 147, 174.
See, for example, Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note 23 or Petersen's reply to Majury,
supra note 190.
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interpretations.325 A reflection on the relationship between the Charter and its
jurisprudential interlocutors dovetails with this thesis. As many scholars have
suggested, the Charter was designed primarily by the federal government as part
of a unifying and nation-building strategy, to enhance the collective psyche of
a Canadian identity that would counteract the centrifugal forces disaggregating
the country, most particularly provincialism and regionalism. 326 However, as this
review of the literature has indicated, at least in the realm of jurisprudence, the
effect seems to have been the opposite. While it would be somewhat linear to
suggest that the Charter has caused327 jurisprudential polarisation, it is probably
accurate to suggest that Charter discourse has provided a forum 'for dissensus,
an opportunity for divergences, the ramifications of which are more immediately
apparent than, for example, the differences around federalism might suggest.
Moreover, the dissensus is not superficial. It has necessitated careful
reconsideration of our assumptions about the nature of the state328 and it has
called into question fundamental visions of what a good society should strive to
be, with very different conceptions of rights, liberty, freedom, and equality and
the balances that need to be drawn between them. Indeed, as the arguments
advanced by Turpel indicate, the problems may not just be those of divergence,
but of an incommensurability of legal cultures in which the Charter is
reunderstood as cultural, political, constitutional and juridical colonialism. 329 Not
quite what Trudeau had in mind, eh?330
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For a brief introduction to this literature see, for example, R. Devlin, "Law,
Postmodernism and Resistance: Rethinking the Significance of the Irish Hunger Strike"
(1994) 14 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3.
Mandel, supra note 8 at 33; R. Knopff & F. Morton, "Nation-Building and the
Canadian Charter of Right and Freedoms" in A. Cairns and C. Williams,
Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada (Toronto: University Press, 1985)
at 133; P. Russell, "The Political Purposes of The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 30; Webber, supra note 22 at 92-120.
The concept of causation has empiricist overtones that are probably inappropriate for
an analysis that attempts to evaluate the connection between discursive practices such
as the Charter and legal theory.
Fudge, supra note 86 at 459, Herman, supra note 22 at 9, 126.
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P. Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society" in Trudeau, P. & T. Axworthy, eds.,
Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years (Toronto: Viking, 1990) 357 at 363 and
Axworthy, "Colliding Visions: The Debate Over The Charter of Rights- and Freedoms
1980-81" in Weiler & Elliott, supra note 4 at 13. The general public appears to be a
great deal more cohesive than legal theorists in their assessment of the Charter. In a poll
taken in 1992, Angus Reid found that the vast majority of Canadians supported the
Charter and believed that their rights had increased in the course of the previous
decade. See Angus Reid, "A Decade with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1 1 April, 1992). Some may be tempted to read this as indicative of just how
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This fragmentation of the jurispruc;iential conversation has come about, I
would suggest, because the nature of political discourse in Canada has
undergone transition in the last two decades. Since Confederation, traditionally
the primary focus of political concern has been the federalist dilemma: how to
allocate power between provinces and the central government. Other political
controversies have been filtered through the federalist paradigm. 33 1 But in the last
twenty years, there has been an increasing awareness of how other political
debates are autonomous from and have dynamics independent of those of
federalism, though at times they may intersect with the federalist dilemma. These
political orientations are not so much about geographical or territorial jockeying,
· but rather are connected to the emergence in western societies of what are called
the "new social movements" with an increasing emphasis on identity politics,
that is, a politics that is particularly related to issues of (dis)ability, gender, class,
sexual orientation and/or race. 332 The Charter has been targeted as a terrain of
ideological discourse where identity jurisprudences can be articulated, pursued,
contested, challenged, legitimized and devalued333 resulting in judicial decisions
that are sometimes unpredictable. And it is this lack of predictability that will
ensure a continued jurisprudential engagement because, like it or not, Charter
discourse has taken on a life of its own. Social actors can no longer choose to
ignore it, because unless you are prepared to argue even as a strategy of
resistance, others will use it against you. 334
However, none of this is to claim that many of these developments could not
have taken place absent the Charter. There is excellent legal theory being
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far removed Canada's legal theorists are removed from the larger populace.
A. Fraser, The Spirit of the Laws: Republicanism and the Unfinished Project of
Modernity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
Identity jurisprudence, like identity politics, may cause some concern in that it raises
the spectre of essentialism and standpoint epistemology, i.e., the argument that only
those who embody a particular identity can speak of and to that identity. It is interesting
to note that this has not yet become a major cause of concern in Canadian
jurisprudence. For example, Petersen, who self identifies as lesbian and white, discusses
race ["Institutionalized Racism: The Need for Reform of the Criminal Jury Selection
Process" (1993) 38 McGill L. J. 147] and Ryder who is white and heterosexual
discusses gay and lesbian issues [supra note 189] and Duclos who self- identifies as
heterosexual discusses same sex marriages [N. Duclos, "Some Complicating Thoughts
on Same Sex Marriage" (1991) 1 Law & Sexuality 31.
Fudge & Glasbeek, supra note 39; Herman, supra note 39; Stychin, supra note 45.
That's the bad news. The "good news" is that this also seems to ensure continued
opportunities for legal theorists to add their tuppence worth. Whether this is good for
Canadian so�iety would be the subject of another paper.
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generated by theorists who have not been entranced by the Charter.335 While at
an earlier time, I have been too hasty in suggesting that the Charter has caused
a "sea-change" for Canadian legal theory,336 I still believe that there is a
connection, though not causal. The Charter, I believe, has provided a forum in
which jurisprudence can demonstrate its importance. Whereas other areas of law
- contracts, property or torts - clearly have a significant impact on our social
ordering, the broader perception of these is that they are esoteric and that,
correlatively, theory about such esotericism can only be esotericism squared. The
Charter, on the other hand, tends to be more publicly accessible and engenders
greater symbolic significance; therefore, when theory is invoked to help shed
light, it is seen have some further legitimacy.
A good example may be found in relation to Langille's analysis of judicial
interpretation of the Charter.337 To bolster his analysis he invoked Wittgenstein.
This, in tum, led other theorists to question his use of Wittgenstein338 or to
invoke countervailing theorists,339 which in turn triggered further
Wittgensteinian-inspired rejoinders from Langille and others. 340 So while there
is no logical reason why Wittgenstein could not have been the subject of legal
theory by Canadian jurists, the opportunity was grounded in Charter-inspired
concerns.
A second example may be found in the various discussions around individual
and collective rights. While groupist rights were part of the Canadian
constitutional order prior to 1982, the Charter served as a catalyst to intensify
· the tensions and induce jurisprudential reflection. Issues such as Quebec' s sign
335
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York: Captus University Publications, 1993); Fraser, supra note 331; M. Trebilcock,
The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1993).
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4.
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(1988) 33 McGill L. J. 451.
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Legal Interpretation" (1989) 34 McGill L. J. 603.
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McGill L. J. 145.
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law have engendered debates that are to a significant degree ontological, that is,
based on competing· conceptions about the nature of personhood. 341
A third example also focuses on the question of rights. As I have already
pointed out, orthodoxy assumes that the purpose of rights is to protect the
individual. However, critics of rights have argued that it is only certain interests
of the individual that are protected by rights and that many of our needs are
ignored. In reply, deviationists have argued that rights are important to the extent
that they engender self-valorization among those who are marginalized. But
again others, in tum, ask what sort of self or individual is presumed by such
claims to empowerment: is it an essentialist conception of the self or a socially
constructed sense of the self, a static self or a transgressive self, etc?342
Thus, in my estimation, the most significant impact of the Charter has been
to provide a forum, or more accurately, a discursive opportunity for the
articulation by legal theorists of their conceptions not only of law (its nature, its
functions, its strengths and its limitations), but also of society, the state, the
family and the self. Conklin's work is particularly illustrative as he shifts his "the
constitution as imagery" theory first through debates on Canadian federalism to
Charter interpretation, arguing that the latter tend to trigger pressing debates
about "deep meta-issues of theory and a piercing scrutiny of social/cultural
practice."343 In short, for better or worse, the Charter has transformed Canada's
legal and political "langscape"344 and jurisprudence, as a dialect within that
langscape, has inevitably been impacted by this transformation.
Another question which sometimes arises is whether there is anything
distinctive about Canadian jurisprudence. On occasion, some scholars have
suggested that either in general345 or with specific regard to the Charter346 there
is something particular about Canadian legal theory and constitutional practice.
As the preceding overview might suggest, debates on the issues of individualism
and communitarianism,judicial absolutism and democratic politics, gender, race,
class, and sexual orientation, the interpretive tum, etc. also pervade American
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legal theory. Indeed, many Canadian scholars, explicitly and implicitly, often
rely on the insights of leading American theorists. But there remain some
important differences. As might be obvious, in my opinion the voice of
progressive scholars is quite strong in Canada whereas in the United States despite the emergence of feminism, critical legal studies and critical race theory
- the primary axis of debate remains right vs. liberal rather than liberal vs. left.
Second, whereas privacy and liberty have been the lodestars for much American
jurisprudence, it would appear that equality discourse has been given a particular
spin by Canadian legal theorists. Third, although every democracy faces the
difficult jurisprudential debate about the legitimacy of judicial review, it has a
particular focus and accent in Canada, given that it is the only jurisdiction in the
world to have a section 33 override provision.
Finally, on the theme of positive patterns, I want briefly to address the issue
of the tone of contemporary jurisprudential debate. Traditionally, debates within
legal theory have tended to be quite polite and when disagreements arose they
were often stated indirectly. However, with the advent of the Charter the
traditional decorum of debates has, on occasion, given way to heated
engagement. While not deteriorating into mutual ad hominems, frequently
contemporary disputes are articulated with a pointedness that until now has been
somewhat unusual. 347 David Beatty, in particular, seems to have attracted
particular attention. 348 In my opinion such a shift in tone is not something that we
should be too concerned about. All it indicates is that the issues at stake matter;
that jurisprudence is not solely the abstract pursuit of pure knowledge (although
some may aspire to that) but also is a practice which can have direct and
practical consequences both materially and ideologically. 349
347

348

349
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B. Potential Problems

While I am clearly impressed with recent developments in Anglophone legal
theory, there are (as might be expected) some problems.
First, as pointed out earlier, a great deal of Charter-based jurisprudence has
been preoccupied with the issue of the legitimacy of judicial review. While this
is clearly important, it seems to me that after fifteen years many of the arguments
(both pro and c·o n) are fairly clearly formulated and that on occasion some
scholars are starting to sound like broken records. 350 Perhaps then there is more
room for discussion of issues such as republicanism,351 or greater efforts could
be taken to be more programmatic in developing theories. Reconstructionists
such as Nedelsky and Trakman are still extremely abstract in their visions, while
strategic skeptics need to do more to concretize their thoughts on when Charter
engagement may be desirable or not, or delineate possible alternative
structures. 352
Moreover, within the Charter itself, there appears to be a somewhat uneven
jurisprudential division of labour. For example, while freedom of expression,
freedom of association and the equality provisions seem to have generated a
great deal of attention, the legal rights provisions (with the exception of those
that deal with issues of gender353) appear to be under theorized354 even though
they have been the subject of the most extensive judicial attention in the Charter
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regime. Similarly, the pressing and extremely vital issue of Charter remedies has
gained only a relatively small amount of jurisprudential analysis.355
Third, there is also the problem that because so many jurists have been
attracted to Charter analyses other pressing political and social problems have
been underanalyzed. For example, NAFT A �as generated minimal
jurisprudential consideration,356 and federalism (and in particular its interplay
with the Charter) has been put on the backbumer by theorists even though it has
been of crucial political significance.357
Finally, as pointed out previously, Canadian jurisprudence has been attracted
to the interpretive, the idea that what binds us together legally and politically is
an implied commitment to ongoing debate, conversation and dialogue. This is
obviously an attractive metaphor in that it assumes a basic substratum of
commonality that makes social, political, and legal interaction plausible and
intelligible. However, one problem with this metaphor is that its abstraction
allows it to be invoked by jurists of very different stripes. While it is true that not
all Canadian jurists buy into the metaphor - Mandel for example wants us
(who?) back on the streets,358 and others warn us that conversational metaphors
can reinforce oppression359 or obscure situational inequalities360 - my sense is
that too many Canadian jurists fetishize the metaphor of dialogue. In a sense, it
is almost as if they conceive of politico-legal practice as a near perfect
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jurisprudence seminar. 361 While many recognize problems with the metaphor, to
my mind most underestimate just how deep our differences might be.
For example, the assumption seems to be that the differences are _essentially
substantive and that with sufficient communicative goodwill it is possible to
eventually get to yes. 362 However, there are several problems here. First, and
obviously, politics and power are driven as much by bad faith as by good faith
and this inevitable reality cannot be glossed over. Second, even assuming that
parties to a politico-juridical dialogue were to operate in good faith, there is the
question of what language they are to communicate in. The assumptions here
appear to be twofold: language is equally available to all, and that language is
basically transparent and neutral. 363 But again, not everyone has equal access to
language, either qualitatively or quantitatively, thus there is the danger of the
"dictatorship of the articulate."364 Moreover, a language is not just a medium, it
also captures and refracts specific cultural norms and practices that are not
always translatable. 365 No where in the Anglophone scholarship reviewed have
I encountered a jurist even considering whether the dialogue should be in a
language other than English. This is not just a political or moral problem, which
would be serious enough; it is also epistemological. Third, advocates of
dialogism concur that the conversation should remain continually open, but
again there are at least two problems here: a) do most citizens really have that
much time available?; b) at some point some decisions have to be made, even
relatively temporary ones, and so some mechanisms for closure are inevitable,
or else some players may continue to discuss simply to avoid ever getting to a
resolution.366 In short, when we unpack it the premise underlying the dialogic
model is that of liberal contractualism, a regime of haggling, a world of offering
361
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and counter-offering, of giving and taking. But this is a deeply optimistic vision
for, as Carol Pateman has pointed out, contract rather than being the apotheosis
of freedom and choice might well be a highly refined form of subordination.367
VI.

CONCLUSION

Rod MacDonald once pessimistically bemoaned that "the summer of 1 982"
was characterized by the "quiescence of Canadian legal theorists."368 Fortunately,
to my mind, this slumber did not last long. Indeed, as I have attempted to
demonstrate in this essay, Charter-driven jurisprudence has had a significant
impact, both quantitively and qualitatively, on Anglophone Canadian legal
scholarship.
Thought and theory clearly have their limits, and Canadian society is unlikely
to take its cue from the ruminations of academics. But while theory is not
everything, it is more than nothing. Theory is only as important as the context
and circumstances in which it is produced, disseminated and given effect. In that
sense, it should not be considered to be in opposition to practice, but rather as
another form of practice, a terrain of discursive struggle that intersects and
overlaps with other social practices.
Moreover, as this essay suggests, there is no longer much consensus on what
might constitute the core of jurisprudential analysis. Rather, with the
mushrooming of legal theoretical work, there has been increasing dissensus and
. a corresponding emergence of what might be most usefully described as
jurisprudential pluralism. In other words, it is probably not helpful to think of
jurisprudence as a static paradigm, but rather as terrain of struggle in which
several incommensurable paradigms are in play, a constellation of incongruent
and dynamic discourses.369 If this is accurate then it seems to me to be unhelpful
to conceive of legal theory in an instrumentalist sense, as the source of
determinative right answers, as Dickson C.J. seemed to have hoped.370
Jurisprudence is not oracular. What theory can do, however, is to help us identify
and rethink some of the assumptions we take for granted. Moreover, it can reveal
to us the contingency of such assumptions and thereby facilitate the recognition
of the plurality of perspectives that can be brought to bear on law. While the
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Charter cannot be said to have caused this fractionalization in Canadian legal
theory, Charter based claims and Charter discourse has been an important
discursive terrain for the articulation of this dissensus.37 1 In short, the Charter is
both fractured and fracturing. And so I would conclude by suggesting that rather
than promoting order and coherence, contemporary Charter-inspired legal theory
refracts the messiness of the problematic that is called Canada.

371

P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 1 1 7.

1997
Revue d'etudes constitutionnelles

